Dating brian edmonds
Failure to consider this first step of analysis incorrectly leads to a focus on the hearsay exceptions as the source of inadmissibility.This incorrect method of analysis is evident in the common practice of leaping to a single (and usually the most obvious) hearsay exception and, upon seeing that the proof does not meet the exception, assuming the proof is wholly inadmissible, simply because it does not meet that single exception.Her friend approached, telling him to stop, and stating that his mother had called the police. The “rule” in Dickerson and Smith is really a rule about KRE 801A(a)(2) and operates only within that context; it is not a rule for all out-of-court statements that might be consistent with a witness's testimony.
H.'s statement did not directly identify Appellant as J. The statement, at most, only indirectly identified Appellant as the perpetrator, and even then, that is only the case when considered in light of all the other evidence in the case, which included the victim's testimony that Appellant was the perpetrator.Appellant, Brian Dewayne Edmonds, appeals his convictions for first-degree sodomy, intimidating a participant in the legal process, second-degree wanton endangerment, third-degree terroristic threatening, and being a Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) in the first degree. First, he argues the trial court failed to properly limit the testimony of the sexual assault nurse examiner, and thereby committed reversible error. reported she had been sexually assaulted by Appellant, her boyfriend at the time. after he asked her if she wanted him to leave, and she replied, “Yes, if you want to.”J. testified Appellant choked her and dragged her by the hair into their bedroom. at the University of Louisville Hospital after the sexual assault. H., examined and documented her injuries, collected items for forensic analysis, and prepared a written report. That the statements repeated by the SANE were consistent with the victim's trial testimony does not mean they automatically fall under the rule discussed in Dickerson and Smith.Second, Appellant argues the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of intimidating a witness in the legal process. The couple lived together in an apartment with her three children when the sexual assault occurred. H., there was tension between the couple because she was attending school and had reconnected with some old friends on Facebook. was in the living room of her apartment, wearing only a t-shirt, when Appellant became upset with her around midnight, after he discovered she was using her cell phone to send a Facebook message to a male friend. He repeatedly asked her why she was doing this to him, why she did not love him, and stated she should not have killed their baby, referencing the abortion she had earlier that year. He removed her t-shirt and used a roll of duct tape that had been sitting on the couple's nightstand to bind her legs together. testified that Appellant had smothered her during the attack by pressing her face into the bed, and that the anal intercourse continued for approximately two minutes before she started to bleed. to go into the living room near the air conditioner because she complained she could not catch her breath. He had told her she could not leave the apartment, but when he went to the bathroom, she escaped and ran toward two men who happened to be outside under a tent, where they had hooked up a television and were, in J. Testimony of the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Appellant argues that Melissa Edlin, a sexual assault nurse examiner (or SANE), was improperly allowed to testify as to hearsay statements of the victim and to give her opinion about the source of the victim's injuries. Having reviewed the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Edlin's testimony. She testified about her findings at trial, frequently reading them from her report. Appellant's argument misconstrues how the rule governing the admission of prior consistent statements operates, and mistakenly treats it as an independent bar to certain testimony.But as she took the phone and began to dial, Appellant ran out of the apartment and knocked the phone out of her hand. At trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sodomy, second-degree wanton endangerment, intimidating a participant in the legal process, third-degree terroristic threatening, and being a first-degree PFO. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Thus, in Appellant's view, Edlin's testimony was duplicative and without its own probative force, and its admission acted only to bolster the victim's testimony. W.3d 451, 472 (Ky.2005) ( “It is improper to permit a witness to testify that another witness has made prior consistent statements, absent an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence. Otherwise, the witness is simply vouching for the truthfulness of the declarant's statement, which we have held to be reversible error.”); Smith v. W.2d 514, 517 (Ky.1995) (“[A] witness cannot be corroborated by proof that on previous occasions he has made the same statements as those made in his testimony.” (quoting Eubank v. The rule that Dickerson and Smith, and the Appellant, are concerned with is KRE 801A(a)(2), which excludes certain statements from the hearsay rule, so long as they meet its requirements.
She ran around the tent, with him chasing her and waving his gun. He now appeals his conviction and sentence as a matter of right. This, Appellant claims, is clearly forbidden under Kentucky law. This rule is not a bar to the admission of testimony and can only ever be authority for the admission of evidence despite the hearsay prohibition in KRE 802.KRE 803(4) provides that out-of-court statements “made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis,” are not excluded by the hearsay rule. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 949 (4th Cir.1988)), and arose from the declarant's purpose of promoting treatment. There is little doubt that a statement about recent anal sexual activity is relevant to the “inception or general character of the cause or external source” of an injury to the anus reported to be the product of nonconsensual sex, and is the type of statement that a physician may rely on in treatment or diagnosis.